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S U P P L E M E N T T O  
EXTENDED CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING  
TO DISARMAMENT  
during period  
4 January - 2 March 1956  
(Revised Version)

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4 Jan 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in lieu of approving the recommendation in the revised plan of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, agreed to note the revised draft plan. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to direct the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, in collaboration with the Joint Logistics Plans Committee and the Joint Intelligence Committee, "to submit comments and recommendations for an inspection system designed to cover only the initial step (Eisenhower Proposal) of the plan in JCS 1731/156 and to require less than a total of one thousand personnel."

(28) Dec On JCS 1731/156, 5 Jan 56, CCS 092  
(4-14-45) BP pt 5.

13 Jan 56

Mr. Stassen submitted a further report for consideration by the National Security Council, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1496, (22 December 1955). The report advanced reasons why an early decision on U.S. policy toward limitation of armaments was imperative. It contended that the policy previously recommended (16 December 1955) met three essential tests: (1) attractiveness to world public opinion; (2) improvement of the prospects for peace and enhancement of U.S. security, provided the plan were accepted by the Soviet Union and effectively implemented; and (3) mutual benefit to the Soviet Union. The report also attempted to dispose of three objections to the proposed policy, namely, charges that it went too far, that it did not go far enough, and that the details had not been spelled out.

After advancing further arguments for certain portions of the proposals, Mr. Stassen's report recommended that the Council adopt revised Volume V (16 December 1955). In addition, the report recommended the draft of a reply to Mr. Bulganin's letter to President Eisenhower of 19 September 1955. This draft was "submitted now to indicate the manner in which the recommended policy would be pursued and reflected to the USSR and to the people of the world."

(28) Memo, ExecSecy NSC to NSC, "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 13 Jan 56, w/encl, Report by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 58 pt. 1.

19 Jan 56

Mr. Stassen asked Secretary Wilson for the views of the Department of Defense on the suitability of five strips of territory in the Southern United States for a test inspection as proposed in the draft letter to Mr. Bulganin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were subsequently asked to comment on Mr. Stassen's letter.

(28) JCS 1731/156, Note by Secys, "Preliminary Test Area for Aerial Inspection," 31 Jan 56, CCS 092  
(4-14-45) sec 59.

19 Jan 56

Mr. Stassen requested the Department of Defense to determine what force levels would be reasonable for major nations should they agree to limit armaments. He suggested certain assumptions for the study and asked that the department analyze the effect upon U.S. security of various force levels ranging from 1.5 million to 3 million each for the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. Further, he requested that the

department estimate the benefits and/or disadvantages that would accrue from acceptance of the force levels proposed by the Soviet Union on 10 May 1955. The department was also asked to suggest what minimum force levels would be acceptable for all militarily significant countries, assuming equal levels for the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. Stassen requested that the department indicate how its conclusions would be altered if either or both of the following conditions were to obtain: (a) cessation of further nuclear production on 1 January 1958, and (b) effective control to prevent the development, production, and stockpiling of ballistic missiles. Finally, posing a somewhat different set of assumptions, Mr. Stassen asked for an estimate of what reciprocal modest reductions of conventional forces and armaments would be compatible with U.S. security.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked by the Secretary of Defense to comment on Mr. Stassen's request.

(S) JCS 1631/170, Note by Secys, "Study of Force Levels of Major Nations in Connection with United States Policy on Disarmament," 6 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 59.

20 Jan 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented to the Secretary of Defense on Mr. Stassen's report of 13 January 1956. Reiterating their views of 20 December 1955, they expressed concern about the continued failure of Mr. Stassen's memoranda to spell out clearly whether or not the United States would adhere to a policy of proceeding step by step from the President's Geneva proposal to a comprehensive disarmament program.

In addition, they suggested that Mr. Stassen's report be reworded to include President Eisenhower's statements at Geneva on the need to test the inspection system before reducing armaments. They pointed out that the draft letter to Premier Bulganin was not wholly consistent with the policies proposed by Mr. Stassen. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Secretary of Defense adhere to his position of 7 December 1955, which they summarized as follows: "(a) each step we take with respect to any disarmament plan must enhance the security of the United States, (b) items proposed for approval are interdependent and do not lend themselves to decision on an individual basis, (c) consideration of individual items will militate against an objective evaluation of the policy as a whole, and (d) action to approve policy recommendations should be deferred until opportunity has been afforded to study the forthcoming inspection and control plan."

(TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef "Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)," 20 Jan 55, derived from JCS 1731/160, same subj, 19 Jan 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 58.

20 Jan 56

A plan for a comprehensive inspection system was presented to Mr. Stassen by Chairmen of Task Forces on Army; Air; Budget and Finance; Communications; General Industrial and Power; Navy; Nuclear; and Steel Inspection. This plan was a composite of individual Task Force reports. The Task Force Chairmen recommended that the plan be circulated for comment to U.S. departments and agencies, and, after incorporation of their comments, that it be sent to the proper level for consideration.

The Chairmen warned against weakening the planned retaliatory capability of the United States and the Western coalition by granting concessions while negotiating for an agreement on armaments or inspection systems.

They advised that agreements for armaments control must provide for (1) step by step exchange of blue prints which would disclose military information, progressing from less sensitive to more sensitive information, and (2) surveillance of selected sources or indicators of surprise attack.

The plan that the Chairmen recommended called for the establishment of an International Armaments Commission under which would function the Western Powers Armament Inspection Headquarters located in Washington. Two principal subdivisions of the Western Powers Inspection Headquarters were envisaged: (1) the Western Powers Inspection Mission in Moscow, under which would operate (a) an area inspection headquarters to supervise military district inspection groups, and (b) a naval sector headquarters with responsibility over naval observer groups; and (2) air sector headquarters at London and Tokyo to supervise the operations of air and technical reconnaissance units and mobile air/ground inspection units.

Disclosure and verification of information would proceed by stages. First, there would be an initial step broken down into a trial phase and a fully implemented phase. The trial phase would provide only for test disclosure and verification of selected information. When the trial phase had been successfully completed, the initial step would be fully implemented. However, during the initial step the information to be disclosed and verified would be limited in scope and largely quantitative in nature. After completion of the initial step, the system would enter upon the comprehensive step, during which the sensitivity of information to be disclosed and verified would increase by stages from less sensitive to more sensitive data.

The plan assumed that the United States would be designated as the executive agent for the management of the western inspection system, and that the Department of Defense would be assigned responsibility for U.S. operations and for the coordination of international operations. It further assumed that the United States would provide all personnel and bear the full cost for the trial phase, and would provide 70 per cent of the personnel and outlays for the fully implemented initial step and for the comprehensive step. Requirements for

U.S. personnel for the trial phase were estimated at 422; for the full implementation of the initial step, 26,235; and for the comprehensive step, 28,683. Costs to the United States for the system were estimated to be: (1) Initial Step, fixed cost for construction and equipment, \$660,200,000; (2) Initial Step, annual operating cost, \$603,900,000; (3) Comprehensive Step, fixed expenses, \$12,400,000 (in addition to fixed expenses for the initial step); (4) Comprehensive Step, annual operating cost, \$629,100,000.

Appended to the composite plan were detailed reports of the Task Forces, giving fuller explanations of the organizational structure, functions, and mode of operations of the components of the system. The appendix on nuclear inspection was noteworthy in that it discussed the protection of U.S. information from premature disclosure, as well as the verification of Soviet information. The military sections of the report showed some similarity with the plan for an inspection system approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 October. These sections, however, did not follow the JCS-approved plan in all particulars.

(ms) Disarmament Study, Task Forces Study of Inspection and Control Methods, "Comprehensive Inspection Plan," 20 Jan 56, four volumes, CCS 092 (4-14-45) B.P. Pt. 5-A.

23 Jan 56

In a long letter to President Eisenhower, Mr. Bulganin proposed the conclusion of a twenty-year Soviet-American treaty of friendship and cooperation. Among other arguments advanced for the treaty was the following: "The improvement of Soviet-American relations would lighten the task of putting an end to the armaments race and would contribute to a fuller utilization of the economic resources of states in the interest of peace."

Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXIV (6 Feb 56), pp. 193-195.

23 Jan 56

The U.N. Disarmament Commission met in New York. U.S. Representative Lodge denied the Soviet charge that the United States had withdrawn its support of disarmament. Ambassador Lodge stated: "The United States remains pledged to work for, it earnestly desires, and it energetically seeks a comprehensive, progressive, enforceable agreement for the reduction of military expenditures, arms, armaments, and armed forces under effective international inspection and control. We are ready to consider any reasonable approach to that goal, including the method of limited approaches or installments, each of which would narrow disagreement and foster an increase of confidence so that the deadlock can be broken. We think that the President's plan would lead promptly and directly to these objectives, that it would promote that international confidence which is indispensable to agreement, that it would provide practical experience in many of the control and inspection measures required to supervise a disarmament." The Disarmament Commission, taking note of the General Assembly's resolution of 16 December 1955, agreed that its subcommittee (Canada, France, U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.) should resume talks and submit an

interim report in about six weeks.

Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXIV (6 Feb 56), pp. 222-223.

25 Jan 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the Secretary of Defense with a statement on disarmament incorporating "a more positive approach." They recommended that this statement be presented to the National Security Council for consideration on 26 January.

The statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed events since 1950, with emphasis on U.S. decisions on disarmament in 1955. Stating that the existing world situation provided no justification for a view that Communist objectives had changed or that the Soviets were willing to scale down their military capability, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that "the military strength of the United States continues to be the major deterrent to aggression." Therefore, "United States disarmament policy must give assurance, beyond question, that any plan derived therefrom would not diminish the security of the United States."

Appended to the statement was an 8-point policy on disarmament: (1) seek an international system for regulation and reduction of all armaments, taking into account the President's proposal for an international pool of atomic materials for peaceful use, under an adequately safeguarded and comprehensive plan; (2) concurrently make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues; (3) continue the steady development of the U.S. and Free World strength required for U.S. security; (4) continue to press for implementation of the President's Geneva proposal as a first priority objective of U.S. disarmament policy; (5) avoid the regulation of nuclear weapons, means of their delivery, or tests, except as part of a final-phase disarmament arrangement; (6) recognize that the scope and effectiveness of safeguards, and especially the inspection system, must govern the acceptability and character of any plan for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments; (7) emphasize that "The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspection and reporting and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results"; and (8) accelerate efforts to elicit favorable world opinion concerning the sincerity, soundness, and objectivity of U.S. disarmament proposals.

As written, paragraphs 1-3 of this statement retained the language of NSC Action No. 1419-b (30 June 1955). However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that paragraphs 1 and 2 be rewritten to make the resolution of current major international issues a prerequisite to seeking an international system for the regulation and reduction of all armaments.

(TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament." 25 Jan 56, derived from JCS 1731/163, same subj, same date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 58.

26 Jan 56

The National Security Council discussed Mr. Stassen's memoranda of 16 December 1955 and 13 January 1956 in

light of the comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 and 25 January 1956, and by the Secretary of State on 26 January. (The gist of Mr. Dulles' objections was that the Stassen proposals did not go far enough to maintain U.S. leadership in the free world coalition and to secure the essential support of world public opinion.) The council noted that the President authorized the use of Mr. Stassen's recommendations for: (1) the preparation of a draft speech, to be delivered by a responsible Administration spokesman, which would enable the President and the Council to assess the probable effect thereof on world opinion, Allied governments, and Soviet leaders; (2) the refinement and improvement of the draft letter to Mr. Bulganin proposed in the Stassen memorandum of 13 January, decision being reserved for the future on the form, substance, and desirability of sending such a letter; and (3) preliminary consultations with the British, avoiding disclosure of the proposed U.S. position in its entirety, but exploring step by step, without commitment, specific items considered immediately desirable.

(TS) NSC Action No. 1510, 26 Jan 56.

27 Jan 56

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee was directed to report its comment and recommendation on the four-volume Task Forces Study on a Comprehensive Inspection Plan by 20 February 1956.

(C) JCS 1731/165, "Disarmament Study," 27 Jan 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 58.

28 Jan 56

President Eisenhower, in a letter to Mr. Bulganin rejected the Soviet leader's proposal for a treaty of friendship. The President touched upon the question of disarmament. He spoke of Soviet rejection of the "open skies" proposal, and stated: "Consider, Mr. Chairman, what a vast change would be effected not only in our relations but throughout the entire world . . . if there were arranged such mutual opening of our countries to inspection that the possibilities of surprise attack would vanish and if reductions of armament were made practical, with the release of productive power for the betterment of mankind."

Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXIV (6 Feb 56), pp. 191-193.

1 Feb 56

Mr. Bulganin, renewing his proposal for a Soviet-American treaty of friendship, discussed Soviet unilateral reduction of armaments and withdrawal from its last military base on Finnish soil. He contrasted Soviet action with the increase of American forces and bases in foreign territory. Mr. Bulganin again rejected the President's open skies proposal. Speaking for his colleagues, he wrote: "It seems to us that in the present international situation and, moreover, under conditions of a completely unrestricted armaments race, the carrying out of such flights would not only fail to free the people from the fear of a new war, but on the contrary would intensify that fear and mutual suspicion." He continued: "It would be a different matter, if we could agree on a reduction of armaments and armed forces. Then, the carrying out of an appropriate control, the



methods of which could be agreed upon, would be justified and necessary."

Washington Post and Times Herald, 3 Feb 56, 29:1.

1 Feb 56

The "Declaration of Washington," which included the following paragraphs on disarmament, was issued at the conclusion of meetings between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden:

"We shall persevere in seeking a just and lasting peace and a universal and effectively controlled disarmament which will relieve mankind of the burden and terror of modern weapons.

"Meanwhile, the society of free nations must retain the power needed to deter aggression. We recognize that such power should never serve as a means of national aggrandizement but only as an essential shield for every member of the community of nations.

"We are determined to make the conquest of the atom a pathway to peaceful progress, not a road to doom."

Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXXIV (13 Feb 56), p. 232.

2 Feb 56

Asking for comment by noon on 7 February, Mr. Stassen forwarded to departments and agencies a draft message from the President to Congress, a draft letter to Mr. Bulganin, and a draft message from the President to the American people. The draft letter formed the core of this document; the two messages discussed the letter. The draft letter, a reply to Mr. Bulganin's request of 19 September 1955 for information on whether the President's Geneva proposal would lead to reduction of armaments, enumerated the steps that the United States would agree to take following the adoption of the system for the exchange of blueprints and mutual aerial inspection proposed by the President and the ground inspection system proposed by Mr. Bulganin. These steps were as follows: (1) after the inspection system proved satisfactory, to agree that all future production of nuclear materials anywhere in the world should be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes; (2) within the first year following successful operation of the system, to agree to a reduction of armed forces, military budgets, and armaments (a figure of 2,500,000 men under arms for each nation was suggested as illustrative); (3) during the first year of operations to study and negotiate for further reductions of forces and armaments, and for gradual transfer of additional nuclear materials from weapons stockpiles to stockpiles for peaceful purposes; (4) to agree with the Soviet Union that each nation would notify the other of contemplated troop movements in international waters or airspace and over foreign soil; (5) to agree to extend the inspection system to bases and forces on foreign soil and to other nations upon their agreement; (6) if basic agreement were reached on the manner of inspecting and reducing armaments, to establish an international Arms Regulation Council; (7) to reaffirm jointly with the Soviet Union existing commitments not to use nuclear weapons except



in defense against aggression; and (8) to agree jointly with the Soviet Union to provide small amounts of tactical nuclear weapons for use by modest police forces of the Arms Regulation Council.

The draft letter further suggested taking "preliminary demonstration steps" designed to facilitate study of the problems of disarmament and to show the world a mutual determination to agree. These preliminary steps would include: (1) the test exchange of information and verification by inspection of small areas containing less sensitive installations, and (2) the exchange of small technical missions for training and orientation purposes.

(S) Memo, Stassen to SecState, SecDef, CJCS, and others, "Public Statement on U.S. Position on 'Disarmament,'" 2 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 58 pt. 1.

6 Feb 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to the Secretary of Defense their general comments on the three documents prepared by Mr. Stassen (2 February 1956). They noted that they had not had an opportunity to prepare detailed comments, because of the shortness of time, but were in process of doing so.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that it would be premature for the United States to commit itself to reduce armaments. "Considering present world conditions and the evasive and deceptive tactics of the Communists, the Joint Chiefs of Staff can see no valid reason why the United States should now feel impelled to propose specified reductions for negotiation purposes. . . . In the disarmament field we must . . . hold to the principle that our security will not permit the risk of bartering away United States military strength based on Soviet agreement to a vague and untried inspection system.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it desirable that negotiations should be pursued with the objective of obtaining those preconditions which would insure an equitable disarmament agreement. In their opinion, Mr. Stassen's proposed policy statements do not proceed from this predicate. It would therefore be highly undesirable to transmit to the Congress, or the public, the messages set forth in the attachments to Mr. Stassen's memorandum. Similarly, the preliminary draft letter to Premier Bulganin would, from a military point of view, be unacceptable in its present form."

The Joint Chiefs recommended that these comments from the basis of the reply from the Secretary of Defense to Mr. Stassen.

(S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Public Statement on U.S. Position on 'Disarmament,'" 6 Feb 56, derived from JCS 1731/169, same subj, 4 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 59.

7 Feb 56

Deputy Secretary Robertson forwarded to Mr. Stassen the views of the Department of Defense on the proposed letter to Premier Bulganin and the draft Presidential message. After endorsing the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (6 February 1956), Mr. Robertson added further arguments to his own. He strongly urged that the National Security Council be afforded an opportunity to

consider Mr. Stassen's proposals because they had not previously been adopted as national policy.

Mr. Robertson felt strongly that the United States Government must at all times avoid any indication that its policies were influenced by fear or the future. He agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, from a military point of view, reductions in the U.S. force levels could be effected only as part of a comprehensive system for the regulation and control of armed forces and armaments, or as a result of a clear demonstration of a decrease in the need for maintaining forces and armaments at present levels. Proceeding from these considerations, Mr. Robertson suggested major modifications in the draft letter from Mr. Bulganin.

(S) Ltr, Deputy SecDef to Stassen, 7 Feb 56, Encl to JCS 1731/174, 10 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 58 pt 1.

7 Feb 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their comments on Mr. Stassen's proposal of 19 January 1956 for the designation of strips of U.S. territory for preliminary test inspections. They pointed out that the proposed exchange and verification of information on installations within the selected areas were apparently to be offered without being linked to prior acceptance of the Eisenhower Geneva proposal (21 July 1955) or to prior mutual agreement on the criteria to govern the selection of military establishments to be within a given test area. Lacking such criteria, the Chiefs found it impossible to determine whether the proposed areas were suitable for test inspections. Moreover, they pointed out that discussion of specific areas prior to the establishment of such criteria could be detrimental to the United States. In short, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it was premature to consider the suitability of the test areas proposed by Mr. Stassen.

(TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Preliminary Test Area for Armament Inspection." 7 Feb 56, derived from JCS 1731/168, same subj, 2 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 59.

7 Feb 56

The National Security Council discussed the proposed letter to Premier Bulganin and the drafts of Presidential messages contained in Mr. Stassen's memorandum of 2 February 1955. The Council noted the President's decision not to use the draft statements. The Council also noted that the President decided: (1) that the Secretary of State and Mr. Stassen submit to him at an early date a reply to Mr. Bulganin; (2) that the Secretary of State inform the British Government that the United States would not be in position during the forthcoming disarmament meetings to agree to negotiating a reduction of total levels of U.S. armed forces based upon the criterion of manpower; (3) that, as a basis for negotiating with the Soviets, Mr. Stassen develop the proposal to designate small strips of territory in the United States and the Soviet Union, within which to test the feasibility of inspection systems; (4) that Mr. Stassen report to the Council on the feasibility of measures to reduce major types of armaments, especially those capable of delivering nuclear weapons, for which an effective

inspection system had been developed; and (5) that the U.S. position in the forthcoming meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee include: (a) proposals for advance notification of projected movements of armed units through international air space or waters or over foreign soil, and (b) proposals for an exchange, for a test period, of a small number of personnel who could be used as members of inspection teams if an inspection agreement were subsequently concluded.

(NSC) NSC Action No. 1513, (7 Feb 56).

8 Feb 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their detailed comments on the proposed draft letter to Mr. Bulganin (2 February 1956). The comments were directed against portions of the draft detrimental to U.S. security interest and contrary to existing policy. The following points were brought out: [

In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff offered general comments on the draft letter and Presidential messages. These comments suggested the general approach favored by the Chiefs in any reply to Premier Bulganin. They would not use the letter to the Soviet leader as a vehicle to announce new policy, but rather limit it essentially to "those broad aspects of the subject upon which there is general United States-USSR agreement and to enlarge upon the views of the President, as expressed at Geneva, especially with respect to the basic problem of inspection and control."

In the opinion of the Chiefs, "the response to the Bulganin letter affords an excellent opportunity to re-emphasize the fundamental features of the current

United States position and to expose the inadequacies of the Soviet view as revealed in the Bulganin letter and other recent Soviet pronouncements." For example, the reply should exploit the inconsistency of the Soviet position in calling for agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons while recognizing the impossibility of insuring compliance with such an agreement. In addition, the reply should reiterate that it was necessary to create a safeguarded system of inspection before proceeding to consider, on a hypothetical basis, reductions in force levels. The reply should also give due emphasis to the need for greater mutual confidence as a precondition for limitation of armaments.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the draft Presidential messages would also have to conform with the letter to Mr. Bulganin. They suggested that a major theme of the messages should be that "arms do not create world tensions rather arms are created only against the possibility that world conditions will deteriorate to the point where resort to arms must be made to preserve a nation's security."

(S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Public Statement on U.S. Position on Disarmament," 8 Feb 56, derived from JCS 1731/172, same subj. 7 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 59.

8 Feb 56

Mr. Stassen transmitted to the President a revision of the draft letter to Premier Bulganin which took into account some of the objections raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense. For example, Mr. Stassen deleted from the revision specific illustrations of reductions in armaments, and also the reference to an Arms Regulation Commission equipped with tactical nuclear weapons.

(S) Memo, Stassen to President "Letter to Bulganin on 'Disarmament,'" 8 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 58 pt 1.

9 Feb 56

In a conversation with British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins and Mr. Stassen, Secretary of State Dulles announced tentative U.S. policy on disarmament. Mr. Dulles said, "... it is the weapons rather than the men which should be the primary subject of agreement and control. On this basis, if agreement were confined to the USSR and US, the US would want to maintain approximately the present level of forces and armament. We would, however, be prepared to consider a lower postulated number of men in the armed forces if an appropriate formula can be found which embraces Communist China." Sir Roger expressed sympathy with the U.S. position but pointed out "that it would be a task of some ingenuity to give this a proper public relations aspect." Mr. Stassen asked that the British Government give some thought to the question of how best to make a public presentation of a common position along the line indicated by Mr. Dulles.

(S) Memo of Conversation, SecState, Sir Roger Makins, and Mr. Stassen, 9 Feb 56, Encl to SM-118-56, Memo, Secy JCS to JCS, "Disarmament," 14 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 60.

10 Feb 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their comments on the revised draft letter to Premier Bulganin (8 February 1956). The Chiefs noted that, while some of their views on the first draft had been incorporated in the revision, "specific safeguards which they consider essential to avoid risk to our security have not been adequately reflected."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out "that the latest draft letter to Bulganin retains proposals that are either in conflict with or outside United States national policy on disarmament. For this reason, and in light of their previous comments on specifics /8 February 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the proposed letter to Bulganin as now redrafted is unacceptable from the military point of view."

(S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Letter to Bulganin on 'Disarmament,'" 10 Feb 56, derived from JCS 1731/173, same subj, 9 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 59.

10 Feb 56

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson informed President Eisenhower that Mr. Stassen's revised draft letter to Premier Bulganin was not fully responsive to comments by the Department of Defense. He recommended that the draft be formally referred to the National Security Council for further consideration prior to its being sent.

(S) Ltr, Deputy SecDef to Pres, 10 Feb 56, N/H of JCS 1731/173, 13 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 59.

17 Feb 56

Deputy Secretary Robertson requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide him with specific criteria to govern the selection of the military establishments to be included in a small strip of territory for test inspections. He also asked the Chiefs to provide criteria for the exclusion of any installations, or portions of installations, that they believed necessary to exempt from inspection. Finally, he requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to designate an area within the United States that met the criteria they recommended.

(S) Memo, Deputy SecDef to CJCS, "Preliminary Test Area for Armament Inspection," 17 Feb 56, Encl to JCS 1731/178, same subj, same date, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 60.

21 Feb 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their recommended criteria for the selection of military installations to be included in an area for a preliminary test inspection and the criteria for the installations and portions of installations to be excluded. From Mr. Stassen's five proposed test strips (19 January 1956) they selected area No. 4, which included Fort Benning, Pensacola Naval Air Station, and Maxwell Air Force Base, among other military installations. They pointed out, however, "that establishment of criteria both for inclusion and exclusion of military installations is, in itself, insufficient to assure an acceptable exchange of information. The methods and procedures for exchanging and verifying information, as well as the rights and limitations of the observers, both ground and air, are an essential part of any proposal for a small scale test of an armaments inspection

system." The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that the procedures and rights that they had set forth in their draft plan of 19 October 1955 should be included in the preliminary test proposal by Mr. Stassen.

(TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Preliminary Test Area for Armament Inspection," 21 Feb 56, derived from JCS 1731/179, same subj, 20 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 60.

23 Feb 56

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee (in collaboration with other joint committees) forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a plan that provided "an illustrative basis for an armed forces inspection system" to implement the Eisenhower proposal (21 July 1955) [ ]

Ground inspectors would maintain general surveillance over known and suspected weapons and delivery systems capable of launching a surprise attack and would verify the exchanged blueprints by spot checking. [ ]

(TS) JCS 1731/180, Rpt by JSPC, "Armaments Inspection System Requiring Less Than One Thousand Personnel," 23 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 61. (Note: As of 2 March 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not taken final action on this plan.)

24 Feb 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the Secretary of Defense with information on which to base a reply to Mr. Stassen's letter of 19 January 1956 requesting the Department of Defense to study force levels of major nations. [ ]

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff, "because of the virtual impossibility of furnishing an exact and meaningful estimate of the impact of force reduction on U.S. national security without knowledge of the conditions existing at the time, and because of the many complex problems which must be solved before such reductions could be implemented," recommended that "the Department of Defense maintain its position that certain preconditions must be met before commitments on specific force reductions are even discussed."

(TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Study of Force Levels of Major Nations in Connection with United States Policy on Disarmament," 24 Feb 56, derived from JCS 1731/177, same subj, 17 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 60.

27 Feb 56

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson forwarded to Mr. Stassen with approval the JCS study on preliminary test inspection areas (21 February 1956).

(TS) Ltr, Deputy SecDef to Stassen, 27 Feb 56, N/H of JCS 1731/179, 29 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 60.

29 Feb 56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented to the Secretary of Defense on the four-volume report by the Chairman of Mr. Stassen's Special Task Group on a comprehensive inspection plan (20 January 1956). The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the plan "a significant contribution in the complex field of inspection of national armaments and armed forces," but pointed out seven specific features of the plan which made it unsuitable for adoption as the U.S. proposal for an inspection system.



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The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the above comments from the basis of the position of the Department of Defense on the plan and requested that they be given the opportunity to comment on the plan after it had been revised in the light of comments by interested departments and agencies.

(TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Comprehensive Inspection Plan," 29 Feb 56, derived from JCS 1731/181, same subj, 23 Feb 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 61.

1 Mar 56

Deputy Secretary Robertson, in response to a request from the President, informed Secretary of State Dulles of the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense on a suggestion that the United States propose or accede to over-all force level reductions to 2.5 million each for the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. The view of the department was that U.S. basic national security was sound and that, in the absence of the resolution of outstanding issues between the Communist Bloc and the Free World, this policy could not be supported by a lower level of forces than that maintained. Much of Mr. Robertson's argument followed the line of reasoning developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum of 24 February 1956. In addition, he advanced reason for not reducing U.S. forces deployed in Europe and in the Far East. The department recommended that reductions in force levels be neither proposed nor accepted until tensions had eased and the adequacy of an inspection and reporting system had been demonstrated over a reasonable period of time. Finally, Mr. Robertson suggested including a paragraph, along the lines of the department's views, in the position paper for the U.S. Delegate to the forthcoming meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Commission's Subcommittee.

(S) Ltr, Deputy SecDef to SecState, 1 Mar 56, Encl to (TS) JCS 1731/182, Note by Secys, "Department of Defense Position on Force Level Reductions," 6 Mar 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 60.

1 Mar 56

President Eisenhower replied to Premier Bulganin's letters of 19 September 1955 and 1 February 1956. The President expressed his confidence that adoption of his Geneva proposal combined with the Soviet-proposed ground inspection teams, thus reducing the danger of surprise attack, would lead to reduced armaments, lessened tension and brightened prospects for durable peace. Assuring the Soviet Premier of U.S. resolution to achieve these ends, the President stated that the U.S. representative on the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission would be prepared to help develop a program to carry out that resolve.

Assuming the satisfactory adoption of the air and ground inspection system, the United States would be prepared to work out safeguarded arrangements for providing that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons. These measures could be combined with the President's proposal of 8 December 1953 for contributing uranium and fissionable materials to an international agency.

The President did not call for specific reductions in force levels in the present state of international affairs, and especially in the absence of real peace in the Far East. Rather, he spoke of the desirability of agreeing on "measures having a stabilizing effect, dealing with the control and limitation, under proper safeguards, of major types of armaments."

Mr. Eisenhower expressed confidence that if the nations on the Subcommittee could reach basic agreement, other nations would join in, thus permitting the expansion of the inspection system to forces and facilities outside Soviet and U.S. borders. He assured the Soviet leader that during the transitional period, when U.S. strength would continue great, the United States would continue to hold its might not for narrow purposes but as a contribution toward world stability.

In conclusion, he welcomed the indication that the Soviet Government was giving major attention to the problem of armaments and again rejected the Soviet-proposed twenty-year treaty of friendship. The President did, however, say that he would continue to study the proposal "with a view to seeing whether it seems that any useful new steps can be taken as between us."

Encl to (U) JCS 1731/183, Note by Secys, "President's Letter to Bulganin," 8 Mar 56, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec 60. NYT, 7 Mar 56, 16.